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Abstract
The security of wireless sensor networks is an active
topic of research where both symmetric and asymmetric
key cryptography issues have been studied. Due to their
computational feasibility on typical sensor nodes, sym-
metric key algorithms that use the same key to encrypt
and decrypt messages have been intensively studied and
perfectly deployed in such environment. Because of the
wireless sensor’s limited infrastructure, the bottleneck
challenge for deploying these algorithms is the key dis-
tribution. For the same reason of resources restriction,
key distribution mechanisms which are used in tradi-
tional wireless networks are not efficient for sensor net-
works.
To overcome the key distribution problem, several
key pre-distribution algorithms and techniques that as-
sign keys or keying material for the networks nodes in
an offline phase have been introduced recently. In this
paper, we introduce a supplemental distribution tech-
nique based on the communication pattern and deploy-
ment knowledge modeling. Our technique is based on
the hierarchical grid deployment. For granting a pro-
portional security level with number of dependent sen-
sors, we use different polynomials in different orders
with different weights. In seek of our proposed work’s
value, we provide a detailed analysis on the used re-
sources, resulting security, resiliency, and connectivity
compared with other related works.
Keywords: Sensor network security, key pre-
distribution, deployment knowledge, grid network, com-
munication efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Sensor network consists of a huge number of sen-
sor nodes which are inexpensive, low-powered and
resources-constrained small devices [5]. The typical
sensor node contains a power unit, a sensing unit,
a processing unit, a storage unit, and a wireless
transceiver (T/R) [1]. The concept of micro-sensing
and wireless connection in the sensor network promises
several applications in military, environment, health-
care, and many other commercial domains [15]. Due
to sensor nodes resources’ constraints, public key algo-
rithms such like Deffie-Hellman key agreement [7] or
the RSA Signature [28] are undesirable to be used. In
spite of recent results on the computational feasibility
of those algorithms [11, 20, 32, 33], it is still early to
widely deploy these algorithms since using them will
expose a vulnerability to denial of service attack (DoS)
[6, 34].
On the other hand, symmetric key algorithms that
use same key for encrypting and decrypting messages
are desirable in the sensor network. This desirability is
due to the computational lightness on the typical sen-
sors. From another point, due to the weak infrastruc-
ture of the sensor network, traditional secret key distri-
bution mechanisms such like the Key Distribution Cen-
ter (KDC) can not be used. The main issue therefore
is summarized in how to distribute secret keys or key-
ing material that are responsible on generating secret
keys among different sensor nodes [10]. Since the man-
ual modification of the sensors’ contents is undesirable
after the in-field deployment phase, several key pre-
distribution schemes that assign and distribute keying
material or secret keys in an off-line phase have been
proposed. In the following section, we review some of
those schemes followed by our main contribution.
1.1 Related Works
Two of the early works in [2, 3] are widely known
for their novelty. Considering a network that consists
1
of N nodes, in the first work by Blom et. al. [2] a sym-
metric matrix of size N × N is required to store the
different N2 keys for securing communication within
the entire network. Node si ∈ N has row and column
in the matrix. If two nodes si, sj would like to com-
municate, they use the entries Eij in si side and Eji
in sj side which are equal (i.e., Eij = Eji since the
matrix is symmetric). To reduce the memory require-
ments, a slight modification is introduced by Du et al.
[9]. The following are defined, a public matrix G of
size (λ+ 1)×N and a private symmetric matrix D of
size (λ + 1) × (λ + 1) where D entries are generated
randomly. Also, A = (D ·G)T of size N × (λ + 1) is
defined. For a node si, row Ri in A and column Ci in
G are selected. When two nodes si, sj would like even-
tually to communicate securely, they firstly exchange
their Ci,Cj then kij = Ri · Cj is computation in the
side of si and kji = Rj ·Ci is computed in the side of
sj. Note that kji = kij based on the symmetric prop-
erty of A,D,G. The second work by Blundo et. al.
[3] proposed three protocols for secure dynamic confer-
ences [3]. The 2-conferences protocol uses Symmetric
Bivariate Polynomial (SBP) to distribute keys for N
nodes. The SBP has the following general form:
f(x, y) =
t∑
i,j=0
aijx
iyj ,where (aij = aji) (1)
This polynomial is of degree t where t ≤ N . For a node
si with identifier IDi, the share g(y) expressed in Eqn 2
is calculated and loaded to si’s memory for generating
future secret keys. Similarly, for two nodes si, sj that
would like to communicate securely, kij = g
i(j), kji =
gj(i) are evaluated locally in the corresponding sides
and used respectively as secret keys.
gi(y) = f(i, y) (2)
In the sensor networks era, the early scheme of key
pre-distribution specifically for WSN is introduced by
Eschenauer and Gligor (a.k.a., EG scheme) [10].
In EG scheme, each node is let to randomly pick a
key ring Sk of size k from a big keys pool of size P .
The picking process maintains a probabilistic connec-
tivity between any node and other nodes in the entire
network. This connectivity is noted as pactual and de-
fined as pactual = 1 −
((P−k)!)2
(P−2k)!P ! . If two nodes si, sj
share a key k : k ∈ Ski ∩ Skj they both can use
k as a secret key. Otherwise, a path key establish-
ment phase via single or several intermediate node(s)
is performed. In [10] the usage of memory is reduced,
however, a frail resiliency is resulted (i.e., if a small
number of nodes are compromised, big communication
fraction of non-compromised nodes is disclosed). To
improve the resiliency, Chan et. al. proposed the
q-composite scheme [4]. Using the same procedure
of EG, a key between two nodes si, sj is available if
and only if Ski ∩ Skj is a set of q number of keys.
If {k1, . . . , kq} ∈ {Ski ∩ Skj}, hash(k1||k2, . . . , ||kq)
is used as kij , kji. Otherwise, intermediate node(s)
are used. More analytical analysis on the probabilistic
schemes is shown by Kwang and Kim in [13]
In addition to improving Blom’s scheme in [2], Du
et. al. proposed two schemes for key pre-distribution
in [8, 9]. In the early one they introduced a deploy-
ment knowledge based scheme that improves Blom’s
[2] by avoiding the unnecessary memory, communica-
tion, and computation with reasonable connectivity [8].
In [9], a multi-space matrix scheme based on [2, 10]
is introduced. A τ number of private matrices D
is selected randomly out of ω pre-constructed matri-
ces providing connectivity pactual that is expressed as
pactual = 1 −
((ω−τ)!)2
(ω−2τ)!)ω! . Different As’ are created us-
ing the different Ds’. τ rows of the different As’ are
selected and assigned for each node. For si, sj , if they
have a common space τi,j : τi,j ∈ τi ∩ τj , the rest of
Blom’s scheme is performed. Otherwise, an interme-
diate node that has an intermediate space is used to
construct a path key in a path key establishment phase.
Even though much memory and communication are re-
quired and smaller connectivity is generated, this work
provides a higher resiliency than in both of RG [4] and
Chan et. al. [10]. For more accuracy, different deploy-
ment structures with practical error measurements and
the probability distribution functions pdf based on [8]
are introduced by Ito et. al. in [14]
Simultaneously, Liu et. al. proposed several
schemes in [18, 19] for key distribution which are
mainly based on Blundo et. al. [3]. In [18], the
polynomial-based mechanism is used to assign several
polynomials for each node in a similar way of EG
scheme [10]. Two nodes can establish a secret key if
and only if they share a common polynomial. Other-
wise, the two nodes use an intermediate node for es-
tablishing a secure path.
The most significant work by Liu et. al. is in [18, 19].
In both works, for a network of size N , a two dimen-
sional deployment structure that constructs a grid of
N1/2×N1/2 is suggested. Different nodes are deployed
on different intersecting points and different polyno-
mials are assigned for the different rows and columns
of the grid. For two nodes si and sj , if Ri = Rj or
Ci = Cj , (i.e., both nodes have the same polynomial’s
share), a direct key establishment is performed. Else
(i.e., Ri 6= Rj and Ci 6= Cj), an intermediate node
is used in an a path key establishment phase. In this
work, even if a big fraction of nodes pc of the overall
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network size N is compromised, the network remains
connected via alternative intermediate nodes. The big
fraction pc herein is measured to be pc ≤ 60% of N .
Also, an n-dimensional scheme is introduced in [19].
Finally, the deployment knowledge for special purposes
and applications using probabilistic manner has been
studied in [26, 27] while a general security architecture
has been proposed in [25].
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper we introduce a new scheme using
the Hierarchical Grid as a deployment framework and
Blundo’s scheme as key generator (a.k.a., keying ma-
terial). Through this paper, our main contributions are
the following:
• Provide a scalable, robust, and novel framework
for the key pre-distribution that gives a perfect
connectivity value (i.e., the connectivity is always
equal to ‘1’ using the single hop communication
manner) to establish a pairwise key.
• Optimize the usage of the different network re-
sources, mainly, communication overhead, mem-
ory usage, and required computation.
• Analyze and provide a mathematical model of our
scheme’s performance.
• Provide and discuss the alternative against any
possible security attack against our scheme.
We take advantage of different flat deployment zones
in a hierarchical grid representation for deploying the
different sensor nodes. Based on each sensor node’s lo-
cation, several symmetric polynomials like these intro-
duced in [3] are assigned to generate secret keys. Each
polynomial in the assigned group for every sensor node
is used for securing communication within a targeted
zone. As a result, each node can communicate with
any other node in the network using the shared keying
material. We show how the connectivity approaches a
prefect desirable level in both of the random and non-
random cases. As well, we show the value of our scheme
against some given attacks and study the its security
under the amount of consumed resources.
1.3 Paper Structure
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the notations and definitions which
are used throughout the paper and Section 3 intro-
duces our scheme. We consider an extensive analysis
of our scheme’s connectivity as a main interesting is-
sue in Section 4. In Section 5, we consider the analysis
of resources consumption and the security analysis in
Section 6 considering several attacks. Finally, we intro-
duce a comparison between our work and set of previ-
ous works in Section 7 followed by concluding remarks
in Section 8.
2 Notations and Definitions
The following definitions and notations are used
throughout the rest of this paper.
2.1 Definitions
Definition 1 (Network order n). a network design pa-
rameter that indicates the size of the network and the
number of polynomials used in each sensor node.
Definition 2 (Basic grid or basic zone). set of sensor
nodes in a geographical area that initially use the same
polynomial of degree t0
Definition 3 (Polynomial Order O). an integer that
decides the scope where the polynomial is used to es-
tablish a secure pair-wise key, where O ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Each node has some minimum order of 1 and maxi-
mum order of n
Definition 4 (Polynomial Degree t0). a security pa-
rameter that indicates the strength of the polynomial
against the compromise and expresses how many dif-
ferent nodes that carry shares of this polynomial must
be compromised for revealing the polynomial itself for
an attacker. The subscription 0 to n expresses the or-
der of the polynomial.
2.2 Notations
The notation in table 1 is used through the rest of
the paper.
3 HGBS for Pairwise KPD
Our scheme uses Blundo [3] as a keying material gen-
erating block to generate different secret keys for dif-
ferent nodes. The distribution of the keying material is
performed on sensor nodes deployed in a Hierarchical
Grid as shown in Figure 1. Our grid mainly consid-
ers the routing grid used in [17] with slight modifica-
tion. This modification relies on using the duplication
growth factor to move from an order to another. In our
work, we aim to provide each sensor node with a set of
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Table 1. Notation
Term Indication
n the network order
N number of sensor nodes in the entire network
m number of sensor nodes in the basic grid Bz
k modes distribution unit through the network
Bz basic zone (also, Basic Grid)
Ox order of the x
th network grid
t0 degree of the basic polynomial in the Bz
tn degree of the polynomial for grid of order n
si, sj sensor nodes
IDi identifier of the sensor node i
Gn number of the Basic Zones in the network
different polynomials for establishing secret keys. The
main rule of the different polynomials is to make sev-
eral zones with varying number of nodes approachable
by a given node. In the following subsections, we pro-
vide a description of our scheme including the following
points: the deployment grid overview, node identifica-
tion mechanism, keying material generation, secure key
establishment and the scheme parameters adjustment.
3.1 Overview of the Deployment Grid
Consider a network that consists of N sensor nodes.
The different nodes are deployed in a network of grid
structure as of Figure 1. In this deployment struc-
ture, the network is divided into n hierarchical orders of
grids. Each order i consists of 2i−1 basic zone. The ba-
sic zone Bz is a geographical region bounded by [2k, 2k]
dimensions (i.e., length and width). Also, k is identified
as the a uniform distribution unit of the sensor nodes
in the WSN and the length unit as well. The number of
the nodes m in Bz is (2k)
2. The order defined earlier is
used to represent the growth of the network. The high-
est order On contains Gn=2
n−1 number of basic grids.
The total number of nodes in the network is N where
N = m × Gn = (2k)
2 × 2n−1. As shown in Figure 1,
Bz is any grid with the dimensions [G1X,G1Y] which
has O1. Similarly, the dimensions [G2X,G2Y] are con-
sidered for grids of order 2 (O2), [G3X,G3Y] will be
considered for O3, and so on until On. An obvious
note to mention here is that any zone which belongs
to order Oa includes twice as much as the number of
nodes in zone Oa−1.
G3X
G2X
G1X
k
k
G
1Y
G
2Y
G
3Y
G
1Y
G
2Y
G
3Y
k
Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Figure 1. Sensor nodes deployment in a hier-
archical grids network
3.2 Node Identifier
Our scheme uses a smart identification material (ID)
which is unique for each node through the network.
The function of the ID in our scheme is to identify the
node within the network, to represent the keying mate-
rial (i.e. polynomials) of the node, and to provide “an
extra sense” of the node location assuming a limited
mobility.
The use of the hierarchical grid with a duplicat-
ing growth factor makes it possible to represent the
different basic zones of Figure 1 in a binary tree as
shown in Figure 2. In this tree, the height represents
the maximum order and the number of leaves repre-
sents the number of basic zones in the network. For
each leaf node, the attached numbers are sequences
that represent the identifiers of different nodes within
the same basic zones (i.e. local ID in a Bz where
1 ≤ IDlocal ≤ m). The different polynomials are as-
signed to the internal nodes of the tree. In the tree,
left branches are assigned to “0” bit value and right
branches to “1” bit value. The final sensor node’s ID
is the binary string of tracing the path from the root
to the end leaf that the sensor belongs to concatenated
with the local ID. This structure of ID is shown in
Figure 3. The length of this ID can be expressed as
follows
|ID| = n+ ⌈lg(m)⌉ (3)
Where m is is the number of nodes in the basic zone.
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Figure 2. Node ID generation determining
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D-Bits [Unique Node ID in WSN]
Figure 3. Node ID structure in the hierarchical
grid
For a network with a large size, n can be considered
a constant for a flexible design that accepts dynamic
network growth.
3.3 Key Material Assignment
Several keying material (or simply polynomials) is
assigned for the different sensor nodes. Using the grid
deployment structure as of Figure 1, different polyno-
mials with the appropriate security parameter are as-
signed for the node based on which grids of which order
it belongs to. Initially, SBP of degree t0 which is as-
signed to the corresponding basic grid Bz is assigned
for establishing secret keys for the pairs of nodes within
the same Bz. The usage of this polynomial will pro-
vide a value of 12n−1 of direct connectivity. The other
polynomials are used for the connectivity to reach the
desirable one based on the node’s location and granting
the corresponding connectivity.
We assume that the nodes which are deployed within
the same basic grid have the higher probability for
communicating with each other and those outside the
concerned basic grid have a less communication prob-
ability. This assumption is important since the usage
of the polynomials with small degree that require a
less computation power is so frequent and the usage
of the higher degree polynomials is less frequent. The
procedure of generating the keying material and the
assignment for the different sensor nodes is shown in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Keying material assignment
Input : Network order n, set of all nodes’
IDs, set of path IDs d, Network size
N
Output: n polynomials shares for each node
x as kx.
for i = 1 to n do1
for j = 0 to 2i−1 do2
p[n− i+ 1][j]⇐SBP of degree t3
end4
for x = 1 to N do5
kx[n− i+ 1] =6
p[n− i+ 1][d/(2(i−1)](IDx, y)
end7
end8
3.4 Key Establishment
To secure the communication between nodes si, sj ,
secret key generation is required. Considering the ID of
both nodes and the polynomial set generated by the al-
gorithm in Algorithm 1, firstly, a polynomial f∗(x, y)
is selected out of the shared polynomials in the two
nodes. The selected polynomial must be common in
both nodes’ polynomials with the minimum t-degree
(i.e., referring to Figure 2, the the most close parent to
the leaves of both nodes si, sj). To establish the secure
key, Algorithm 2 is applied. Note that, this algorithm
is applied in both of si, sj to generate the pairwise key.
Also, only the polynomial share is used after its evalua-
tion in algorithm in Algorithm 1 as expressed in Eqn 2.
Algorithm 2: Key establishment procedure
Input : Path identifiers di, dj , node’s sj ID
(j), set of node’s i polynomials
shares; ki[]
Output: Symmetric key Kij .
Begin;1
for c = 0 to di.length− 1 do2
if di[c] = dj [c] then3
g(y) = ki[c];4
Break;5
end6
end7
kij = g(j)8
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3.5 Parameters Adjustment
The critical parameter in our scheme that control
the resources usage and resulting security is the poly-
nomial degree t0 and the relationship between t0 and
other polynomials’ degrees in the different orders. A
less important factor in our scheme’s analysis is the
communication traffic function (CTF).
The degree t0 is totally dependent on the number of
nodes in the basic grid [3]. In [29], the authors assigned
t0 to be 20. However, this assumption does not provide
correlated dynamic security strength with the change
of network size. Generally, if we consider 0 < α ≤ 1 as
a security parameter, t0 can be expressed as t = α ∗m
for more reliable security assumption. Using the same
memory as in [12], t0 can be assigned to 0.6×m which
will make the basic zone secure till the compromise of
0.6m+1 number of nodes that belong to the same grid.
For a different numbers of nodes in the network, Figure
8 shows the required memory in KB to store the dif-
ferent polynomial coefficients. On the other hand, the
remaining (n− 1)-polynomials’ degrees t1, t2, · · · , tn−1
are to follow one of the following approaches: (i) To
have the value of t0 and the growth of the network order
will lead to the same value of the polynomial growth.
(ii) To consider the different t degrees independently.
For the communication traffic function (CTF), our
deployment scenario considers that the nodes which are
mostly to communicate are the neighbors in the same
basic grid while other nodes in other grids have a less
traffic fraction. In the analysis, we consider two differ-
ent functions: The geometric series distribution func-
tion and the exponential distribution functions. Note
that, the summation of probabilities for the commu-
nication from a given zone that represents a set of
given nodes to all other zones is equal to one (i.e.∑n
i=1 ppdf = 1). For a geometric CTF, c is determined
satisfying Eqn 4.
CTF =
n∑
i=1
( c
2i−1
)
= 1 (4)
4 Connectivity
Dividing the network hierarchically provides a con-
nectivity using more than one keying material (i.e.,
symmetric polynomials). This connectivity enables dif-
ferent nodes belonging to different basic grids to com-
municate securely in 1-hop fashion. Let us consider C
as the provided connectivity. Based on the structure of
the grid, the polynomial assigned to Bz provides con-
nectivity of C1 which is expressed as
m
m×2n−1 =
1
2n−1 .
In general terms, the polynomial for the ith order grid
provides connectivity of m×2
i−1
m×2n−1 =
1
2n−i for the nodes
that belong to it. Thus, for the highest order, the pro-
vided connectivity is m×2
n−1
m×2n−1 = 1 which exclusively
includes all of the below orders’ connectivity (i.e., Ci
for i = 0 to n− 1).
For a more general conception, we consider two
types of connectivity. The first type conceptualize the
connectivity that considers sensor nodes si, sj in the
network regardless to their location while the second
type consider sensor nodes according to their precise
minimum-weighted polynomial that they share. For
the first case, nodes are randomly deployed in the field
and the traffic does not have a regular pattern. The
connectivity is expressed as the probability pz for the
two nodes si, sj to be in the same grid. Similarly, this
can be formulated and expressed as the probability for
two nodes within some order order to exactly belong
to the same minimum order z which enables establish-
ing keys with minimal weighted polynomial. Also, it
can be expressed as the probability of randomly pick-
ing two nodes with the condition that they belong to
the same order. This probability is shown in Figure 6
pz =
(
2(z−1)m
2
)(
N
2
)
−1
=
(
2(z−1)m
2
)(
2(n−1)m
2
)−1
=
(2z−1m)(2z−1m− 1)
(2n−1m)(2n−1m− 1)
=
(
2z−n
)( 2z−1m− 1
2n−1m− 1
)
(5)
Consider a, b as two integers such that a ≥ b > 1, ab
is always greater than or equal to a−1b−1 . Applying this
to Eqn 5 we get that (2
z−1m−1)
(2n−1m−1) ≤ 2
z−n. From all, we
get:
pz ≤
(
2(z−n)
)2
(6)
On the other hand, the second type of connectivity con-
siders two nodes si, sj, where their used polynomial to
generate secret key is previously determined based on
the fixed deployment structure and traffic model. A
connectivity Ci is determined as the provided certain
connectivity provided by the minimal network order
that the two nodes belong to. This is typically equiv-
alent to the connectivity provided by any polynomial
assigned for any the given polynomial order as in Eqn 7.
Ci =
2i−1
2n−1
= 2i−n (7)
For both pz and Ci, the overall connectivity is de-
fined as the provided ability to each node to commu-
nicate securely with other nodes in secure manner re-
gardless to the order they belong to and the shared
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Figure 4. Connectivity with different traffic
parameters
polynomial they use. In other words, the overall con-
nectivity is determined as the value of pz or Ci when z
or i go to n as follows:
Cn =
(
2(z−n)
)2 ∣∣∣∣
z=n
=
(
2(i−n)
) ∣∣∣∣
i=n
= 1 (8)
For a general connectivity form that considers de-
gree of randomness which determines each node’s
knowledge of the deployment structure given and the
accuracy of communication model description [22], we
define β as communication pattern’s parameter where
C = (2i−n)β and 1 ≤ β ≤ 2. Figure 4 shows the
connectivity provided by the order’s polynomials ac-
cording to different β values.
5 Overhead Analysis
In this part we consider our scheme’s overhead. This
overhead is mainly represented by the memory required
for the keying material representation, the computa-
tion required for a single bivariate polynomial’s evalu-
ation on GF(q) in a single variable, and the commu-
nication required for exchanging the concerned sensor
node’s identifiers.
5.1 Network Capacity
Our scheme uses the different resources of the net-
work in a reasonable manner. The reduction in using
any resource can affect other correlated resources and
downgrade the overall performance. In this section, we
measure the cost of our scheme by analytical and math-
ematical formulas in terms of the network resources.
From the details above, the total network capacity N
can be expressed as
N = 2(n−1) × (2k)2 (9)
Where n is the largest polynomial order in the network
and k is the distribution unit of nodes. The relation-
ship between k and n for different network size N and
ranging n is shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
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Figure 5. The relationship between n, k,N for
0 < n ≤ 2.
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Figure 6. The relationship between n, k,N for
0 < n ≤ 10.
5.2 Memory Overhead
The amount of memory which is required per node is
to represent the node ID shown in Eqn 3 and the differ-
ent n-polynomials’ shares. For a polynomial f(x, y) of
degree t0 whose coefficients in GF(q), (t0 + 1)× lg(q)
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bits are required as a representation space. For the
memory use, we introduce two different approaches:
1. To assign different degrees for the different polyno-
mials regardless to the number of the distributed
shares of the polynomial.
2. To make the growth of the different polynomials’
degrees same as that of the growth of the number
of the nodes that hold those polynomials’ shares.
Thus, all polynomials in the first order have degree
t0 and the i
th order polynomials have degree of
2i−1 × t0.
The first case cost in bits is represented in Eqn 10
as follows:
M1 = n+
⌈
lg
(
N
2n−1
)⌉
+ n
(
αN
2n−1
+ 1
)
lg(q)(10)
The first two terms are for the ID representation and
the third term for n-polynomials representation. The
second case is shown in Eqn 11 where the third term is
the summation of the required memory to represent n
polynomials of different degrees and α is the security
parameters, Pweight is f(x, ID)’s (t0 + 1)-coefficients
representation memory.
M2 = n+
⌈
lg
(
N
2n−1
)⌉
+ Pweight
n∑
i=1
(2i−1)
= n+
⌈
lg
(
N
2n−1
)⌉
+ (2n − 1)
(
αN
2n−1
+ 1
)
lg(q)
(11)
Also, the memory requirement in Eqn 11 can be
considered as a geometric series with base r in terms
of the highest order’s polynomial (i.e. r = 12 ). For
this representation, the summation is held for n terms
giving the following:
M3 =
(
1 +
1
2
+ · · ·+
1
2n−1
)
(αN × lg(q))
= (αN × lg(q)) ×
[
n−1∑
i=0
(
1
2
)i]
(12)
Recall that r : −1 < r < 1, the summation of the first
n terms is Sn =
(
1−rn+1
1−r
)
. This gives the following:
M3 = (αN lg(q))
(
1−
(
1
2
)n+1
1− 12
)
(13)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
0
8
16
24
32
αN
M
em
or
y
Figure 7. The required memory for different
security parameters and network size in our
scheme.
Figure 7 shows the required memory for different
network size N and security parameter α. Also, Fig-
ure 8 shows the required memory for the Blundo’s sin-
gle polynomial representation. Note that, the memory
requirements is linearly dependent on both N and α.
5.3 Computation Overhead
Each time a key is required, the evaluation of poly-
nomial f(x, ID) of degree t is performed in single vari-
able. Due to the difference of t degree shown earlier,
different scenarios are considered. In case of using the
first memory scenario, the required computation can
be summarized in a single polynomial f(x, ID) of de-
gree t0 evaluation regardless to the degree. In the sec-
ond scenario where we assign different degree according
to the growth factor for the different network orders,
the communication pattern and communication prob-
ability function based on the location determines the
required polynomial to be computed and the required
computational power.
From other point, evaluating a polynomial of degree
t requires 2t number of multiplications 1. Based on
[16]; using the long integer multiplication, it requires
64 number of 8-bit word multiplication to multiply two
integers in finite field of q = 264. In contrast, it takes
only 27 word multiplication on the same platform us-
ing Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm [16]. Thus, the re-
quired word multiplication for multiplying two integers
1Recall that the computational weight of n-bit n-integers ad-
dition is equivalent to two integers multiplication with the n
length. Initially, the required number of multiplications is 2t− 1
and the additional one due to the addition operation [16]
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Figure 8. Memory requirements for stor-
ing the polynomial’s coefficients in Blundo’s
scheme with varying α.
of length 16 and 64 bits consumes 16 8-bit word mul-
tiplications. This type of different length operations is
required for accumulating a long enough key that fits
with the required standard key length (e.g. DES of 56
bit, AES of 128 and RC5 of 64)2.
CPavg =
(
n∑
i=1
(piCPti)
)
+ c (14)
Eqn. 14 expresses the required computation in
terms of the number of multiplications in GF(q),
where c is computational power required for two bi-
nary strings comparison. These strings represent the
polynomial path identifier part. Also, pi is the proba-
bility that two nodes reside in different (i − 1)th grids
and CPti is the required computational power for the
ith order polynomial evaluation. For two different com-
munication traffic functions, Figure 9 shows the com-
putational consumption growth curve in terms of the
number of multiplications in GF(q) according to the
growth of the network size.
5.4 Communication Overhead
Our scheme does not require any extra means of
communication except of the nodes’ identifiers ex-
change which costs lg(N) bits transmission as discussed
early in the ID representation requirement. The ID it-
self is expressed in a general form as of Eqn 3.
2The RC5 [31] is the most likely to be used on the typical
sensor node platform because of its small code size without a
need for extra tables [25]. Thus, the largest expected finite field
is of 64 bits length.
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Figure 9. Computation overhead for two dif-
ferent Communication Traffic Functions. The
used parameters are t0 = 60, β = 0.6, n = 11
which supports up to N = 204800.
5.5 Reducible Memory Schemes
Since the memory limitation is the bottleneck for
any successfully design in wireless sensor network, any
set of polynomials with an order greater than a desir-
able d such that 1 < d ≤ n can be discarded by giving
up the direct connectivity. To ensure an alternative
connectivity through intermediate node, a virtual grid
as of [18] can be applied. Once this kind of grid is ap-
plied, the higher order polynomials are removed and
replaced by smaller polynomials that represent the vir-
tual grid. Therefore, the final required memory is de-
pendent upon how many orders are discarded but al-
ways less than the required memory overhead expressed
in 12 or 13.
6 Security Analysis
The security of our scheme follows the same anal-
ysis introduced in [3, 18]. The security of all of these
schemes is based on that a network that uses a bivariate
polynomial of degree t is secure against the compromise
as long as the number of revealed shares is less than
or t+ 1. In this section, we consider several attacking
scenarios against our scheme. This includes the node
replication attack [24], the Sybil attack [23], Denial of
Messages (DoM) Attacks [21], and Denial of Service
(DoS) Attacks [34].
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6.1 Compromising Effects and Resiliency
6.1.1 An Attack Against Nc Number of Nodes
In case of compromising a set of nodes whose size is Nc
that is less than t0, the fraction of the affected nodes
other than those which are compromised is 0. This
applies for any kind of attack strategy including the
random and selective one [12].
6.1.2 An attack against Bz
An attack against the single basic zone can be suc-
cessfully performed through the compromise of num-
ber of nodes Nc where Nc > t + 1. By compromising
t+1 number of sensor nodes and revealing their secret
shares, the main polynomial of the concerned node can
be recovered[30]. Even though, this attack looks more
difficult due to that 2n−1 number of polynomials of de-
gree t within the network where the probability pr for
t0 nodes to be belonging to the same polynomial shares
is in Eqn 15.
pr = 1−
t0−1∑
i=0
(
Nc
i
)(m
N
)i (N −m
N
)Nc−i
(15)
The probability pr indicates that the number of sensor
nodes to be compromised by revealing its own secret
shares should be big enough to guarantee that the at
least t0 number of shares belong to a specific polyno-
mial. This primarily based on the polynomial degree
t0 and α, however, over 60% of the network size is a
reasonable threshold for α = 0.6
6.1.3 An attack against the whole network
The attack against the whole network can not be in
synchronized way. However; in the worst case, it is
possible to compromise the entire network by compro-
mising all of the polynomials f(x, y) of t0 one by one.
To compromise Bz requires t0 nodes to be compro-
mised. Since the network consist of Gn different Bz, it
requires to compromise Gn × t0 which is a big fraction
(i.e. more than 60% of the network size). Without this
amount, the fraction of affected nodes will be less than
50% of the network size.
6.1.4 Selective versus random node attack
Even if the nodes are deployed randomly, the knowl-
edge of the nodes deployment and the assigned poly-
nomials for each group and the ability to distinguish
the different nodes based on their Bz enables a se-
lective attack that ease the attackers task. On the
other hand, the random attack where the attacker’s
knowledge about the deployment strategy of the sev-
eral nodes makes it harder to reveal a given polynomial
that generates secure keys for a given polynomial as
shown previously in Eqn 15.
6.1.5 Sybil and node replication attacks
There are two problems belonging to the dynamic
growth of sensor network. Sybil attack [23] is done
fallaciously by using more than one ID for the same
node j and node replication attack [24] which is per-
formed using the same ID more than one time in the
network. Our work resists against these threats be-
cause it requires a structured ID which is unique with
a uniform structure over the entire network. When
an attacker fabricates a structured ID, it should follow
the limited structure shown previously and deploy the
node in specific area to communicate within the same
Bz.
6.1.6 DoM and DoS attacks
Denial of Messages [21] is the ability of some nodes
(i.e., attacker’s nodes) to deprive others of receiving
some broadcast messages. Our framework does not re-
quire any broadcast capability. If any, it will be mainly
used within the same grid. Thus, the DoM attack will
only affect a small fraction of the whole network. An
example of the Denial of Service[34] is “attempts to
prevent a particular individual from accessing a ser-
vice” and this mainly happens due to a heavy commu-
nication or computation because of the key generation
or any outsider reason like attacker messages flooding.
In our scheme, all of the computation and communica-
tion operations are small, and take short time. In the
second case, to perform a DoS, node replication attack
is required.
6.1.7 Man In the Middle Attack (MITM)
Under the assumption that the radio coverage is
enough to enable the usage of the different polynomials
for different targets, the man in the middle attack is im-
possible. In the case of the reduced memory schemes,
the man in the middle attack is possible with small
probability due to that the intermediate nodes are used
for a limited communication fraction of forwarding. As
well, each attacker who would like to deploy his own
sensor nodes to perform the MITM should know the ge-
ographical location where to deploy the different sensor
nodes.
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Table 2. Comparison between our scheme and a set of other schemes in terms of the resources
usage and the resulting connectivity. The connectivity for the probabilistic key pre-distribution
schemes is probabilistic while it is certain for other schemes including ours. Also, the polynomial
degree t differs as shown earlier based on α.
Scheme Communication Computation Memory Connectivity
GBS [18] c SBP Evaluation ID+2 SBP 2
N1/2−1
3D-GBS [18] c SBP Evaluation ID+3 SBP 3
N2/3+N1/3+1
Plat-Based [22] c SBP Evaluation ID+3 SBP 3
N1/3
EG [10] c log2(Sk)
(2c+p−pk)
2 log2(c) Sk keys 1−
((P−k)!)2
(P−2k)!P !
CPS [4] c c Sk keys
m
N
DDHV [9] c log2(n× τ ) 2 vectors mult. τ + 1 vectors 1−
((ω−τ)!)2
(ω−2τ)!ω!
HGBS c SBP Evaluation ID+n SBP 1
6.2 Blocked Traffic and Its Recovery
This paper mainly introduces a new framework for
the key pre-distribution, deployment and smart loca-
tion based identification. However, when we applied
Blundo’s scheme [3], we obtained that even though
the ith order polynomial where 1 < i ≤ n is compro-
mised, this will not affect the other network except of
that amount of traffic (links) within the ith order grid.
Assume the ith order SBP is compromised, the fraction
of the blocked traffic will be m×2
i−1
m×2n−1 × pi =
1
2n−i × pi
where pi is the fraction of traffic between nodes resides
in different the (i− 1)th order grids. Using the current
pi =
1
2i−1 distribution will guarantee that the blocked
communication is always constant value regardless to i
value.
On the recovery; when t+1 nodes are compromised,
an alternative secure SBP can be used. In the case
that an SBP of the cth order grid is compromised, the
SBP for the (c + 1)th order grid is used till the sys-
tem recovery and assigning another polynomial to the
affected grid. In case of the highest order’s polyno-
mial compromise, the amount of traffic compromised
will be only 12p(i=n). If we assume that the fraction is
decreased by half whenever the order of grid increases
by 1, the amount will be will be 12n−1 for pn. How-
ever, the internal network connectivity will not be af-
fected. Moreover, the majority of the secure traffic in
the network will not be broken since the deployment
framework guarantees that most of the traffic is in Bz.
7 Comparison With Others
We selected GBS [18], Multi-space [9], EG [10], Q-
Composite and RPS [4] for the comparison with our
scheme. The compared features are communication,
computation and memory. Table 2 shows this compar-
ison in terms of those resources. In our scheme, mem-
ory, computation and communication requirements are
shown in Eqn 10 to Eqn 14
Remark: the constant value of communication in
GBS depends on whether it’s possible to construct a di-
rect key or not. In case of using an intermediate node,
the communication cost of the intermediate should be
considered. The amount of communication traffic in
our scheme is always constant because of its nature.
8 Conclusion
We proposed a novel framework for the secure key
pre-distribution in the WSN. Our proposed scheme
uses a hierarchical grid for the sensor nodes deploy-
ment that bounds the heavily communicated nodes in
one basic grid that has strong secure keying material.
We also designed an ID structure which is unique
for the node and expresses the location as well as the
keying material to be used. To measure the perfor-
mance of our framework, we used Blundo’s [3] as a
keying material generator block. Mathematical anal-
ysis of the computation, communication and mem-
ory was provided. The different possible attacks were
lightly touched. The performance shown comparison
expressed the value of our framework.
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